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Gaps	in	state	funding	mean	that	liberal	cities	in
conservative	states	are	more	likely	to	lobby	the
federal	government
When	we	hear	the	term	‘lobbying’	we	tend	to	think	mostly	in	terms	of	corporations	and
ideological	groups	working	to	influence	policy	outcomes	at	the	state	and	federal	level.	But
cities	are	often	lobbyists	too.	In	new	research,	Rebecca	Goldstein	and	Hye	Young	You
examine	the	causes	and	consequences	of	lobbying	the	federal	government	by	American
cities.	They	find	that	liberal	cities	in	conservative	states	such	as	New	Orleans,	Tucson,
and	Houston	were	the	most	likely	to	lobby,	a	trend	that	they	explain	may	be	down	to	gaps
between	how	much	these	cities	and	their	states	spend	on	public	services	and	infrastructure.	
Why	do	some	cities	lobby	the	federal	government,	and	others	do	not?	And	does	lobbying	make	a	difference	in	terms
of	federal	resource	allocation?	In	recent	research,	we	answer	these	questions,	finding	that	liberal	cities	in
conservative	states	are	most	likely	to	lobby	the	federal	government,	and	that	such	lobbying	is	associated	with	a
modest	but	significant	in	increase	in	federal	support	to	the	lobbying	cities.
For	our	dataset	on	which	cities	lobby,	we	drew	on	federal	lobbying	disclosures	submitted	by	cities	with	populations
greater	than	25,000	between	1999	and	2012.	We	find	that	42	per	cent	of	such	cities	submitted	at	least	one	lobbying
disclosure.	The	cities	most	engaged	in	lobbying	were	not	America’s	largest	cities,	such	as	New	York	or	Los	Angeles.
Instead,	the	cities	engaged	in	the	most	lobbying	included	New	Orleans,	Tucson,	and	Houston	—	liberal	cities	in
conservative	states.
We	explain	this	result	with	a	model	of	demand	for	public	goods	(such	as	roads,	street	lighting,	policing,	and	other
public	infrastructure	and	services	which	cities	provide).	It	is	well	established	in	the	literature	that	liberal	cities	have
high	preferences	for	spending	on	public	goods	—	a	preference	that	is	shared	by	liberal	state	governments,	but	not	by
conservative	state	governments.	We	predict	differences	in	citizens’	desire	for	the	provision	of	public	goods	will	be
most	pronounced	in	liberal	cities	in	conservative	states.	Using	detailed	public	finance	data,	we	calculated	two
measures	of	the	difference	between	city-	and	state-level	public	goods	expenditure	(which	we	call	the	public	goods
gap):	the	difference	between	each	city’s	direct	expenditures	per	capita	and	the	corresponding	state	government’s
direct	expenditure	per	capita,	and	the	difference	between	each	city’s	total	direct	expenditures	per	capita	and	the	state
government’s	per	capita	transfers	to	each	city.
We	find	that	the	public	goods	gap	matters	to	lobbying:	a	city’s	propensity	to	lobby	the	federal	government	increases
the	larger	the	public	goods	gap	between	the	city	and	the	state.	Demographic	variables	are	also	important
determinants	of	a	city’s	lobbying	activities:	cities	that	are	more	ethnically	diverse	and	unequal	in	income	distribution
are	more	likely	to	participate	in	federal	lobbying.	Their	lobbying	engagement	may	help	to	explain	why	more	ethnically
fragmented	localities	receive	higher	per	capita	transfers	from	higher	levels	of	government,	despite	their	difficulty	in
providing	public	goods	at	the	local	level.
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Our	findings	make	sense	in	light	of	the	political	and	demographic	differences	between	conservative	states	and	liberal
cities.	Liberal	cities	will	often	be	racially	and	economically	diverse,	and	the	city	government	will	often	wish	to	spend
money	(perhaps	more	than	it	can	raise	on	its	own)	on	improving	local	schools,	building	more	affordable	housing,	and
investing	in	public	transit.	In	liberal	states,	the	state	government	may	well	share	these	priorities	and	therefore	be
willing	to	support	the	city.	In	conservative	states,	the	state	government	is	less	likely	to	support	transfers	to	cities	—
given	cities’	policy	priorities	and	the	differing	demographics	between	a	state’s	cities	and	its	non-urban	areas.
Next,	we	turn	to	whether	cities	that	lobby	the	federal	government	receive	more	federal	funds	than	those	that	do	not
lobby.	We	use	data	on	earmarks	and	Recovery	Act	grants	awarded	to	cities,	and	exploit	data	on	the	existence	of	a
direct	flight	from	the	relevant	city	to	Washington,	D.C.,	as	an	instrumental	variable.	Our	regression	results	suggest
that	a	1	per	cent	increase	in	lobbying	spending	increases	the	amount	of	earmarks	and	Recovery	Act	grants	by	1.02
per	cent	and	0.47	per	cent,	respectively.
Our	analysis	has	been	the	first	to	focus	on	local	government	lobbying	of	the	federal	government,	and	its	findings
about	the	dynamics	intergovernmental	relations	are	relevant	to	scholars	and	policymakers	alike.	While	our	findings
shed	significant	light	on	an	important	(and	previously	overlooked)	aspect	of	intergovernmental	relations,	we	hope
they	serve	to	begin	a	broader	conversation.	Do	local	lobbying	strategies	change	when	there	are	changes	to	which
party	is	in	power,	at	either	the	state	or	federal	levels?	Or	is	there	stickiness	in	local	lobbying?	Unlike	other	interest
groups,	cities	represent	voters	with	differing	preferences,	and	given	that	lobbying	spending	comes	from	local
government	budgets,	whose	interests	are	represented	when	cities	lobby?	If	the	returns	to	lobbying	are	so	high,	why
do	some	cities	not	lobby	at	all?	All	these	questions	are	worthy	of	study,	and	we	hope	our	work	opens	up	doors	for
others	to	examine	intergovernmental	lobbying	further.
This	article	is	based	on	the	paper	‘Cities	as	lobbyists’	in	the	American	Journal	of	Political	Science.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.										
Note:		This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	USAPP	–	American	Politics	and	Policy,	nor
the	London	School	of	Economics.
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